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Population-level biomedical research has become crucial to the health system’s ability to improve the health of
the population. This form of research raises a number of well-documented ethical concerns, perhaps the most
significant of which is the inability of the researcher to obtain fully informed specific consent from participants.
Two proposed technical solutions to this problem of consent in large-scale biomedical research that have
become increasingly popular are meta-consent and dynamic consent. We critically examine the ethical and
practical credentials of these proposals and find them lacking. We suggest that the consent problem is not
solved by adopting a technology driven approach grounded in a notion of ‘specific’ consent but by taking
seriously the role of research governance in combination with broader conceptions of consent. In our view, these
approaches misconstrue the rightful location of authority in the way in which population-level biomedical
research activities are structured and organized. We conclude by showing how and why the authority for
determining the nature and shape of choice making about participation ought not to lie with individual par-
ticipants, but rather with the researchers and the research governance process, and that this necessarily leads to
the endorsement of a fully articulated broad consent approach.
Introduction
Large scale or population-level biomedical research
(including big data, genomics and biobanking) has
become one of the most important requirements for
the long-term capacity of a health system that aims to
improve the health of the population. There are signifi-
cant potential benefits to population-level research,
from economies of scale and increased statistical reli-
ability to the enabling of studies that require scale to
function. This includes seeking patterns to identify
preclinical disease markers and establish penetrance of
variants, and the ability to test hypotheses on large
cohorts and to see small effects. The ability to conduct
research at scale and depth has increased rapidly in the
last few years, based on the availability of new technol-
ogies and methods that are increasingly sophisticated.
This form of research raises a number of well-docu-
mented ethical concerns which do and will continue to
haunt the progress of this research in important ways.
Perhaps the most significant of these concerns is the
unfeasibility of the researcher obtaining fully informed
specific consent from participants. In what follows, we
focus on this ‘consent problem’, in light of the fact that
the potential future benefits of this kind of research
depend on its scale and efficiency in ways that run
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directly counter to the requirement of participant in-
formed consent as currently understood.
Two proposed technical solutions to the problem of
consent in large-scale biomedical research that have
become increasingly popular are meta-consent (Ploug
and Holm, 2015, 2016) and dynamic consent (Kaye
et al., 2015). We begin by critically examining the ethical
and practical credentials of these proposals and find
them lacking. We then revisit an older model which
provides a simpler and more effective solution to facili-
tate research without compromising either the ethics or
the potential benefits of future research. Our critique of
meta-consent and dynamic consent as solutions focuses
on the claim made by both to be new, ethically war-
ranted ways of addressing the tension between facilitat-
ing effective large-scale research and obtaining
individual specific consent. We suggest that the ‘consent
problem’ is not solved by adopting a technology-driven
approach grounded in a notion of ‘specific’ consent,
which is unachievable and likely to increase the work-
load of participants and researchers, but by taking ser-
iously the role of research governance in combination
with broader conceptions of consent.
The broad consent model that we propose revisits
aspects of the research governance and consent debate
that have been missed in recent discussions. This model,
in our view, has been all too hastily set aside, perhaps
because it appears technically less sophisticated or be-
cause it is not quite so overtly driven by an aim of max-
imizing choice. We suggest, however, that the mistaken
assumption underlying the dynamic and meta-consent
models is that choice making around research partici-
pation should necessarily always reside with individual
participants. In our view, this misconstrues the rightful
location of authority in population-level biomedical re-
search activities. We conclude by showing how and why
the authority for determining the nature and shape of
choice-making about participation in such research
ought not to lie with individual participants, but
rather with the researchers and the research governance
process, and that this necessarily leads to the endorse-
ment of a broad consent approach.
The relationship of consent to autonomy, and the
nature of autonomy, are central to our arguments.
The reason that we require consent, both historically
and theoretically, is to preserve an agent’s right to au-
tonomous choice (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).
Autonomy is self-determination, which involves form-
ing and acting on a conception of the good life (or a life
plan) and values, free from the interference of others
(Young, 1982), and many choices we make can under-
mine our autonomy or fail to respect it appropriately
(Savulescu, 1994; Savulescu and Momeyer, 1997). Our
point will be that autonomy can be consistent with
taking part in an open-ended project, just as it can be
consistent with a precisely defined or constantly evol-
ving consent process. Marriage involves a commitment
to an uncertain future. So too can research participa-
tion. Autonomy is respected when a participant is given
the opportunity to give or withhold broad consent, pro-
vided they understand the nature of broad consent and
the gravity of what is at stake in participating in popu-
lation-level research studies, broadly construed.
Examples of Population-Level
Research
The following examples are useful in understanding the
kinds of research to which these issues apply, and in
pinpointing the kinds of methodological issues that
are relevant for obtaining valid consent to population-
level research.
Longitudinal, data-intensive research-related projects
run for extended periods of time in order to be able to
model and predict longitudinal patterns of disease over
many years. These projects may be relatively specific, for
example, relating to a single disease area or may be more
general, covering a range of medical conditions, social
and economic factors etc. Such studies exemplify the
kinds of potential issues relating to consent in popula-
tion level research. In such studies, the researcher cannot
predict all of the potential uses of the data in advance,
given the evolving nature of medicine, data science and
computational power. Over time, the researcher may
need to keep track of participants who may be ‘lost to
follow-up’ or who may have died, particularly if re-con-
sent is required. Such studies are dependent for their
scientific validity on consistent cohorts, maintained
over the long term to ensure populations can be tracked
over time so that meaningful comparisons and conclu-
sions can be drawn from the data. This need for stability
implies a certain type of relationship with the partici-
pants, where the broad expectations are explained at the
outset, with the understanding that participants will
generally continue to allow use of data about them for
the duration of the study. For all these reasons, when an
opportunity arises for a potential new data use or re-
search activity, the researcher must decide whether a
particular sub-project (or research activity) is in line
with the original consent. Examples of research of this
type include UK Biobank, The Cooperative Health
Research in South Tyrol (CHRIS) study and Avon








niversity user on 21 January 2021
Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC)
outlined briefly below.
UK Biobank is a resource for population scale longi-
tudinal studies based on an initial recruitment aim of
500,000 people aged 40–69 at recruitment. UK Biobank
collects lifestyle and environmental information, med-
ical history, physical measurements, and biological sam-
ples from participants over the life of their involvement
in the study (UKBiobank, 2007) CHRIS study is a lon-
gitudinal population- based study that began in 2011. It
investigates the genetic basis of common chronic
conditions associated with human ageing. It also looks
at interactions between genetics, life-style, and environ-
ment in the South Tyrolean population (Pattaro et al.,
2015).
The Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and
Children (ALSPAC), or ‘Children of the 90’s is an on-
going longitudinal study of children of mothers who
were pregnant in the early 1990’s in South West
England, and ‘the overall objectives of the study are to
understand the ways in which the physical and social
environments interact over time with genetic inherit-
ance to affect health, behavior and development in in-
fancy, childhood and then into adulthood’ (Golding &
ALSPAC Study Team, 2004).
Dynamic Consent and
Meta-Consent
Informed by the illustrative examples of population re-
search above, we begin by reviewing the advantages and
disadvantages of dynamic and meta-consent as solu-
tions to consent in such research.
Dynamic consent is an IT-based solution developed
in response to challenges presented by consent to bio-
bank research, with potential application in other set-
tings that its proponents argue require ‘re-consent’. It is
dynamic because it involves multiple interactions,
allowing participants to consent to new uses, or to
change their existing permissions (Kaye et al., 2015).
Participants may choose to opt in or opt out of being
re-contacted and opt in or out of new research. They
might, for example, (i) give a broad consent to partici-
pate in all research activities, (ii) give broad consent for
some research activities but not others and then to have
increasing engagement either about re-contact or about
consent to future research if they wish; or (iii) to pause
their interactions with the research, potentially resum-
ing at a later date. Dynamic consent is the idea that
control for all choices and all engagements can be
given to, and left up to, participants.
The implicit rationale for the adoption of dynamic
consent is that it is ethically preferable because it allows
participants more choice and more control (and so per-
haps more exercise of autonomy). Dynamic consent
aims to enable participants to tailor their involvement
as opposed to ‘all or nothing’ or ‘one-off’ consent or
withdrawal (Kaye et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2015).
Meta-consent, by contrast, was developed in response
to questions about whether it is always necessary to seek
informed consent for secondary health-related research
(Ploug and Holm, 2015, 2016). Meta-consent enables
individual decisions about how to approach consent
to future secondary use of both existing and future
data. It functions by allowing individuals to express
their personal preferences regarding the type(s) and fre-
quency of consent decisions—giving them putative con-
trol over precisely how consent will continue to be
sought from them on an individualized basis. The
meta-consent proposal is designed to be instigated as
young adults gain full legal rights with detailed informa-
tion about each potential consent type, and the impli-
cations of choosing each type, to be provided to them
at the point of seeking an initial meta-consent.
Subsequently, the meta-consent proposal requires indi-
viduals to be enabled to continually review and poten-
tially revise their expressed consent procedure
preferences throughout the life course, with the use of
reminders to update consent preferences every few
years.
Because it allows individuals to control the kind of
consent that they give, meta-consent claims to better
respect participant preference (e.g. preferring not to
give further consent) and therefore better respect auton-
omy, than dynamic consent, but the choice is still from a
range of predetermined options. Meta-consent aims to
improve consistency, information and deliberation
about consent decisions (Ploug and Holm, 2016).
Criticisms of Dynamic Consent and
Meta-Consent
These two new approaches to consent for population-
level biomedical research have received some attention,
both positive and negative. In what follows below we
outline the concerns that have been raised and critically
appraise them.
We concentrate on criticisms of dynamic consent be-
cause we understand meta-consent to be a species of
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dynamic consent. Ploug and Holm allow multiple (pre-
sumably unlimited) changes to the specific details of the
consent given by an individual. This means that even if
the scope of the choices is limited to the form that future
consent will take, that choice is dynamic and can change
as often or as little as the participant wishes. Thus, while
being rightfully understood as a version of dynamic con-
sent, meta-consent differs in the sense that it focuses
more specifically on allowing the participant to dynam-
ically control the kind of consent that they favor.
Notably, both dynamic consent and meta-consent
approaches seem to allow some control of the process
to reside with the researcher to some extent. This is
clearest in the meta-consent case, which seemingly
permits researchers to offer a limited range of consent
models to prospective participants. The dynamic
consent approach seems, at various points, to
allow the dynamism to be curtailed and restricted in
various ways, thus taking choice and control away
from the participant. In both cases, the approaches
are silent about why this is the case and precisely
when the control accorded to participants should be
limited in this way. We return to this below in author-
ity section, in the context of what we call the Authority
Problem.
Dynamic consent has been criticized in various ways.
We have grouped these criticisms into four headings
which we discuss in turn.
Practicalities
Dynamic consent claims to be an easy to use and access-
ible system that facilitates research through greater par-
ticipant engagement. In the current technological
context, the value of being able to deliver this kind of
participant engagement platform is clear. It is also clear
that some research in the future will require an active
and ongoing supply of data from participants and so a
dynamic consent approach will require a highly inter-
active technological platform.
The main practical questions surround the ability to
conduct research in an efficient and manageable way,
while remaining true to the task of obtaining a full range
of choices about consent and, where required, fully in-
formed specific consent.
In order for participants to be able to express their
preferences fully, the advocates of dynamic consent
argue that participants need to be aware of the potential
choices. This presents two potential problems. First, the
researcher must decide whether a particular use is cap-
tured by the original consent or not. This judgment can
require interpretation, even if the initial consent was
quite specific. Second, the participant must decide
how they might wish to be informed about any potential
uses and how they might wish to express their prefer-
ences. If a ‘push’ mechanism is used, participants may be
bombarded with an excess of potential choices, may ex-
perience ‘consent fatigue’ and so may disengage from
the process. If a ‘pull’ mechanism is used, expectations
would need to be clear about the rates of change/add-
ition of uses so that participants have an appropriate
time to respond, before the new use is started.
Aside from the decision of when to offer participants
new choices, there are a set of issues (and more choices
for participants) about how choices should be expressed
and the information provided. Healthcare research
activities are complex and it may be difficult or impos-
sible to adequately explain the nature, purposes, and
consequences of particular choices to inform the par-
ticipants in ways that are meaningful to them. A huge
volume of choice and information might well lead to
‘consent fatigue’ with people either opting out com-
pletely, just opting in without reading the options, or
simply not responding. To be clear, this may not prove
to be a problem for researchers or participants in prac-
tice, but may give rise to a kind of broad or blanket
consent by default, which the model was designed to
avoid.
There may also be some related technical barriers
associated with making and enacting choices. The as-
sumption in dynamic consent models is that choices can
be made in (near) real-time using technological plat-
forms to record and propagate preference choices.
Such mechanisms, and particularly those concerned
with the meta-consent proposal are likely to be both
costly and burdensome (Manson, 2019), and may intro-
duce biases as they depend on a certain level of technical
competence which may exclude participants without
computer access or in particular demographic groups.
There may be a time-lag between the making of the
choice and its enactment which is at odds with partici-
pants’ expectations of how their choices should be
honored.
What is most important about these practically ori-
ented concerns is that they point toward the need for
fine-grained ethical judgments that are importantly
related to the kinds of consent that we take to be ethic-
ally required. There are clearly ways around many of
these problems, but they turn on making decisions
about just how many decisions and how much detailed,
interactive information is taken to be important for par-
ticipant choice. We can always provide more choice and
more interactivity: the question is where we take the
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ethical requirement for information provision and spe-
cific choice to run out.
Capturing Preferences and Obtaining Specific
Consent Properly
Ploug and Holm (2015) point out that some partici-
pants would in fact prefer not to make some choices
(about some kinds of research) and that allowing this
preference to be satisfied would overall allow more pref-
erences to be satisfied in the way in which participants
engage with the research (Wallace et al., 2015).
This set of criticisms claims that dynamic consent
appears to force participants to engage with the research
and make choices in ways that go against their prefer-
ences. As we saw above, this seemed to be a key practical
issue. Steinsbekk, Myskja, and Solberg (2013) and Ploug
and Holm (2015) argue that repeatedly asking for con-
sent might in fact reduce engagement by routinizing the
consent process. Requiring participants to constantly
revisit consent does not respect the autonomy of the
person who just wants to support research and have
no further contact. Moreover, it may turn out that the
vast array of choice, and the constant barrage of infor-
mation, could undermine the very choices being made:
allowing people to choose more may make those choices
less informed and or lesser quality (Human Research
Authority & Human Tissue Authority, 2018).
However, as we have seen, dynamic consent does not
require participants to re-consent every time: they can
opt in or opt out of making a choice. Indeed, the dy-
namic consent model explicitly includes provision for
participants to make choices about their level of interest
in consenting (meta-consent) (Kaye et al., 2015;
Williams et al., 2015).
While there may well be persistent questions about
the ability of dynamic consent to meet the standards
required of fully informed specific consent, proponents
of dynamic consent have a clear response to this set of
criticisms, in one respect at least. The dynamic consent
model (and what makes meta-consent a version of dy-
namic consent) allows for dynamism of precisely the
sort that it is being criticized for omitting. Dynamic
consent is not to be understood as simply the view
that individuals are permitted (or required) to make
choices about all research which intends to make use
of their data. Instead, it very clearly allows for multiple
levels of choice on the part of the participant. The par-
ticipant can switch on or switch off as and when they feel
inclined to do so: they can alter their specific choices,
they can alter their choice about the kinds of choice that
they wish to make, and they can adjust the kind and level
of detailed information that they are provided with in
regards to each research use (Kaye et al., 2015).
The Ethical Justification of Dynamic Consent
and the Inferiority of Broad Consent
Beyond the supposed value of enabling a more fine-
grained set of choices, the supposed ethical impetus
behind dynamic consent is that more choice or more
control is more ethical (and importantly, that less
choice, fewer choices and/or less control is unethical
or ethically inferior). This position is tied to debates
about the adequacy of broad consent models of consent
to population-level research programmes. If it were true
that broad consent failed to respect the autonomy of
participants or correspondingly, and that specific con-
sent was the only kind of consent that was ethically ac-
ceptable, then dynamic consent would represent a
genuine, ethical solution to the problem of consent to
population-level research.
However, the claim that broad consent, without the
option of more specific consent if desired, is unethical or
ethically inferior is unwarranted. It rests on the mistaken
idea that only specific consent can count as valid (fully
informed) consent—the fallacy of specific consent
(Sheehan, 2011). Importantly, the presumption that
more choice is more ethical overlooks the fact that we
make perfectly acceptable broad choices on a routine
basis without our autonomy or freedom being under-
mined in an unethical way. We routinely make decisions
that restrict, limit or change the choices that we make in
the future. And, importantly, we routinely decide to
allow others to make decisions that affect us in import-
ant ways. Broad consent to allow others to make deci-
sions on our behalf or according to a settled process are
commonplace and ethically unproblematic.
The argument, then, for the ethical acceptability of
broad consent rests on the simple observation that we
routinely and unproblematically make decisions that
limit or delegate future decisions. Asking a friend to
order for us at a restaurant is just one example
(Sheehan, 2011) of a choice that we can delegate. Once
we see that we commonly make these kinds of choices
and that they are ethically acceptable, we can also see that
the information that we require for those choices is rad-
ically different from the information required for a spe-
cific choice. If we are delegating a choice, we (should)
want to know, for example, how the chooser will make a
choice on our behalves in the future, what kinds of
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general values will be relevant to that choice, and what
the goals are that the choice will aim to achieve.
The idea here is that we see a particular kind of focus
on specific choices to the exclusion of other kinds of
choices. As Manson (2019) has compellingly argued,
we are trapped in a simple clinical model of choice
making that limits how we think about informed con-
sent in our bioethical treatment of population-level and
biobanking research. The claim here is that we presume
that respect for autonomy in this context requires an
unfettered requirement to also promote participants’ au-
tonomy. However, giving participants full control over
decision-making in this way mis-conceptualizes the
underpinning connection between the value of auton-
omy and procedural requirements for obtaining valid
consent from participants. Thus, because broad consent
is just as ethically acceptable as specific consent, dy-
namic consent lacks an ethical imperative for giving
participants more choice; proponents of the model
commit the fallacy of specific consent by equating ex-
panded choice and re-consent with a requirement to
promote autonomy without justification.
However, proponents of dynamic and meta-consent
have something of a response here. After all, both
models allow for broad consent to be given by partici-
pants and it might turn out that the vast majority of
participants opt for broad consent rather than the con-
stant interaction associated with many specific consents.
This is because dynamic consent is better thought of as
an enrollment approach within which specific and
broad consents are permissible.1 The question then re-
mains to justify dynamic consent as an enrollment ap-
proach. We return to this question in the next section.
Resources, Research Benefits and Other Values
Finally, both dynamic consent and meta-consent fail to
pay sufficient attention to the fact that respect for au-
tonomy is only one value amongst others. Even if giving
more and more choice did indeed promote autonomy,
whether autonomy ought to be promoted in this way is
an ethical issue that involves weighing this value against
effective use of limited resources and the moral impera-
tive to conduct research (Thorogood and Zawati, 2015).
To give a trivial example, some participants might like to
choose the sex or dress of the doctor taking their blood,
but this is not a choice that they ought to be given in the
context of other (perhaps, any) constraints.
Participants need to give valid consent to the proced-
ures they are undertaking but it is a further question
whether there is an ethical requirement to obtain spe-
cific consent for future uses of data or biological
materials. The creation and maintenance of biore-
sources and databanks and the infrastructure that sup-
ports them is hugely expensive. In many cases these are
created with public money. The creation and sustain-
ability of such resources is in the public interest. Here,
the tradeoff may well be that there are certain kinds of
uses of data, for the public interest, that outweigh the
requirement to obtain any kind of consent. This is par-
ticularly true if we attend to the structures and govern-
ance of the research institutions that will be permitted to
conduct research using this data. As we suggest below,
governance is important in these settings and can help to
manage risks and confidence in research and research
institutions without the need for choice-intensive
models of participation.
Authority
Thus far, we have considered a number of objections to
both dynamic and meta-consent. These objections are
illuminating but they do not fully settle the issue. Very
briefly, it looks to us as though the most plausible
understanding of the meta-consent approach is that it
is a more closely specified version of the dynamic con-
sent approach. Second, although there are definite prac-
tical concerns about the dynamic consent approach,
these can be dealt with—perhaps with some costs to
efficiency and financial/opportunity costs. People will
disagree about how significant these costs are in relation
to the purported benefits. Third, there are some more
general worries about the quality of the individual par-
ticipant’s consent in the face of a proliferation of choice.
But it may be that the participants themselves are able to
monitor this and adjust their involvement accordingly.
Fourth, the impetus toward dynamic consent (and away
from broad consent) seems to rest on the idea that broad
consent is ethically inferior to specific consent. We have
argued that this is a mistake, but also recognize that
dynamic consent models can include broad consents
and so the degree of disagreement here might be limited.
Finally, we pointed out that respect for autonomy is one
among many values that are at stake in population-level
biomedical research, and that consequently there may
be contexts where the value of the research takes prece-
dence over the requirement to facilitate specific consent
in every case.
In this section we present a distinct and, we suggest,
more pressing objection to dynamic (and meta-consent)
which goes to the heart of broader uncritical trends to-
wards maximizing participation and choice for its own
sake. This objection turns on a question of authority:
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how can we justify giving authority for determining the
nature and shape of choice about participation to indi-
vidual participants (in addition to the choice to partici-
pate)? This question is not explicitly considered in the
literature and, once we reflect on it, we see that it is
difficult to answer and has serious implications for re-
search. We go on to argue that this authority, as it is
rightfully understood, should rest with the researcher
and the research governance process, thus allowing the
participant to make an initial decision to participate
and, as usual, to hard-withdraw at such time as they
no longer wish to be involved.
Recall that in the section above we argued that broad
consent is not ethically inferior to specific consent, and
so there is no general ethical reason to prefer specific
consent over broad consent. These two models of con-
sent are different and require different sets of informa-
tion in order to be properly informed. Importantly, we
have also seen that both dynamic and meta-consent in-
clude broad consent as possible options for participants
entering research. So not only is there a good argument
for thinking that broad consent and specific consent are
ethically equivalent, the proponents of dynamic and
meta-consent have built both options into their systems,
thus agreeing with their ethical equivalence (via permis-
sibility: why would we allow participants to choose an
ethically inferior form of consent?).
But the proponents of dynamic consent clearly still
believe that their approach is preferable to the simpler,
broad consent model. This must be because they take
there to be added (ethical) value attached to giving par-
ticipants control (and hence authority) over the nature
and shape of their interaction with the research rather
than allowing the researcher (and the governance pro-
cess) the authority to determine the nature and shape of
that interaction, which is then chosen (or not) by the
participant.
This is the authority problem: why think that the par-
ticipants should be in control of the nature and shape of
their interaction with the research?
Both the dynamic and meta-consent approaches lar-
gely accord control over the nature and shape of the
choices that are being made by potential research par-
ticipants’ choices to individual participants. It is not
clear that this move is ethically justified. Participants
should retain the right to choose whether they take
part in research or not, and have a right to withdraw if
they do take part, but it does not follow from this that
they have the authority to construct the design of that
research or their engagement with it. Locating authority
entirely with participants overlooks the role of expertise,
particularly of the researcher, in shaping the research.
The following three examples help us to see the problem
and the need for justification here.
Consider first consent to airline travel: As airline pas-
sengers we consent to behave in particular ways with the
expectation that we will be kept safe and arrive at our
chosen destination. Once the plane has begun to taxi, we
may not ordinarily withdraw our consent to flying or
decide that we would like the plane to go somewhere
else. We have committed to a process and will not be
asked for consent to changes that may occur past a cer-
tain point. We are only given the authority to choose
whether to accept the prescribed conditions or not—
these conditions are presumably about safety and effi-
ciency. In this case, ‘participants’ are not given the op-
portunity to choose dynamically; consent to fly to a
particular destination is a process that necessarily ends
at the point the plane begins to taxi.
A second example in this vein involves consenting to
voluntary service overseas (VSO). Here we would expect
that a volunteer may not ordinarily withdraw their con-
sent to participate past a certain point of engagement.
They have committed to a programme of work and
there are implications not only for themselves, but for
other participants and potential beneficiaries, if they
were to withdraw. All volunteers are given appropriate
information and time for consideration prior to joining
up, and, once past a certain point, are discouraged from
reneging on their commitment or deciding that they
would rather be located in a different country or under-
taking a different kind of aid work. Here too individuals
are free to choose to commit to the programme but they
are not given control of the nature of the programme
itself or the permission to withdraw at any time for any
reason. Importantly in this case, the authority to shape
the volunteer programme and what it involved lies with
the programme organizers. The ability of the pro-
gramme to deliver aid and support of various kinds de-
pends on the reliable commitment of the volunteers to
the programme (as it is designed by the organizers).
Both of these examples are clear cases where the au-
thority for choice construction is not given to individual
consenters even though the choice to participate still
firmly remains with them. In the air travel case, passen-
gers are simply not given the choice: that is, they have no
authority to decide about the flight, where it goes or
their involvement in it, once the plane has left the
gate. In the VSO case, the rationale for requiring an
upfront decision rather than allowing dynamic choice
lies with the nature of the enterprise and the authority to
determine the programme. The success of the VSO pro-
gramme depends on the ability of the organizers to
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count on the volunteers not to renege on the choices
they have made.
Of course the VSO case is subtle in important ways.
Under certain special circumstance it might be perfectly
appropriate for a volunteer to discuss possible changes
to their participation in the programme or to withdraw.
It might, for example, turn out that the volunteer feels
uncomfortable being the only foreign woman in a pre-
dominantly male village. This subtlety underlines the
central point about authority: sometimes changes to
the nature of the participation can be justifiably nego-
tiated, but this is in the context of well-defined
authority.
We can contrast these two cases with a third: the pick-
and-mix sandwich shop. There is clearly a significant
advantage to the model of the sandwich shop which
allows customers to choose any variety of sandwich top-
pings (cheese, lettuce, salami etc.) and ‘sandwich forms’
(sliced bread, bun, warmed, with accompaniments,
etc. . .). When it comes to our sandwich lunch, more
choice and more control over the range of choice
looks better. We rightly think that patrons of a sandwich
shop are the authority when it comes to their own
lunchtime eating preferences and so it makes sense to
offer this kind of range of choice. For those who are not
so concerned about too many specific choices, the sand-
wich shop may well offer a range of pre-set sandwich
options too—where some authority for sandwich con-
struction remains with the shopkeepers.
In each of these cases it is clear why the authority to
construct the range of choice lies where it does: the
sandwich shop succeeds or fails on the back of customer
choice, In contrast, the safety and efficiency of airline
travel requires a fixed choice, and the ability of the VSO
programme to deliver aid and support of various kinds
depends on the reliable commitment of volunteers. In
the case of population level research, it is unclear why a
dynamic consent model should be preferred.
Alternatively, it is unclear why population level research
should be thought of as something like consumer-led
activity.
The key to our criticism of dynamic consent (and
meta-consent) is the unexplained and unjustified as-
sumption that the authority to construct and shape
the research, the participants’ involvement in it, and
the authority to choose to participate, lies with the po-
tential participant rather than the researcher and the
research institution. In order for research to be con-
ducted in an ethical, efficient and most effective way
the authority for shaping the research and for construct-
ing the choice given to potential participants should lie
with the researcher and an appropriately expert research
governance process. This does not rule out more choice-
intensive consent processes but it is clear about where
the locus of the authority to determine these processes
should lie. Importantly, potential participants are still
given a fully informed choice which respects their au-
tonomy: they are presented with a research, governance
and enrollment arrangement and choose to be a part of
it or not. The issues here share important similarities
with the VSO example: research can be jeopardized, and
made less efficient or less effective, if participants alter
their preferences mid-stream. Just as the vulnerable
people who stand to be helped by the VSO programme
would suffer if volunteers’ preferences are accommo-
dated without consideration, so future patients would
suffer from poorly conducted research. There is a right
to withdraw, but this right can be structured in advance
of a decision to participate, and importantly, the author-
ity for this structuring does not lie with the participant.
The research enterprise is not an essentially competi-
tive, ‘consumer choice’ situation. It is a social endeavor
aiming at systematically improving the health of future
patients. It is a goal driven activity that aims at the pro-
duction of valuable knowledge. It is methodologically
complex and requires significant knowledge and train-
ing in order to make incremental advances in any given
field of inquiry. Because of these key features, the au-
thority for the design of the offer is intimately depend-
ent on the aims of science and lies with the researchers
and the governance of research. Patients and their inter-
ests are far from irrelevant in this enterprise, but they are
entering a realm of activity in which they are not the
authority. We propose a ‘new’ approach to the question
of consent to large scale or population-level biomedical
research: a combination of broad consent to governance
with participants retaining the right to withdraw from
future research.
Consent for the Future
We have suggested that the future of consent in popu-
lation-level biomedical research requires exploring the
limits of the authority of the participants’ role in shap-
ing and controlling the research. We argue that that
current trends move in a mistaken and unjustified dir-
ection: researchers and research governance structures
are by their nature vested with an authority, and
should draw on expertise to determine the nature
and progression of research. We need to rethink the
future of consent to research at the population-level
and create systems of reflexive governance (See
Figure 1).
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There are general principles for the future of consent
that need to be recognized here. In developing the re-
search programme, researchers, along with the research
institution or sponsor, should produce a protocol
(which will include an articulation of the general pur-
pose of how the data will be used and stored), and they
ought to establish a governance body to administer this
protocol. The choices and decisions involved in the
shaping of the research programme should take into
account all relevant evidence, including evidence
about the wishes of potential participants. This evidence
is of instrumental value: it enables the development of
research programmes which are more likely to recruit
participants and so maximize the chance of benefiting
future patients. Consultation may be broad or narrow
(quantitative or qualitative) and may be evidence gath-
ering, or focused on developing a recommendation for
how the governance arrangements should operate.
Figure 1. Consent for the future: general principles.
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Governance arrangements and decisions will incorp-
orate matters concerning the future direction of re-
search conducted on the data, as well as who has
access and therefore what research is conducted using
the data. Here, the governance body is to be guided by
the original account of the purpose and ethos of the data
stored. Decisions about when and how to consult par-
ticipants and the public may include re-consent in spe-
cial circumstances. These would include policy changes
and changes to data access approach. Ethical principles
of governance are/should be: expertise, independence,
openness, representation, efficiency, culture and con-
duct (Sheehan, Marti, and Roberts, 2014) and include
all stakeholders (research sponsors, researchers, inde-
pendent (scientific) experts, patient representatives)
and members of the public.
Potential participants should be offered broad con-
sent. Participants will decide whether to consent to gov-
ernance arrangements (governance body decisions) and
so consent to allow the governance process to make
decisions about future research etc. Participants retain
the ability to withdraw according to the terms of this
broad consent. Depending on the context, this process
of withdrawl may include complete, hard withdrawal, or
simply withdrawal from future uses. Communicating
information about what is happening with the research
as it evolves is integral to a reflexive governance model.
The information that ought to be provided includes up-
dates, activities and studies available for participation,
but is not about choice.
This future approach to consent is not one where
participants do not have any choice, but it is one
which is embedded within the context of the socially
governed, researcher-led institutions that have appro-
priate expertise and authority to construct and conduct
research that produces public benefit. In considering the
potential harms associated with large-scale biomedical
research, we should include harm caused by not making
further use of the data collected. A large proportion of
medical data are not used or shared effectively (Jones
et al., 2017). There is new potential for harms appearing
with increasing complexity (associated with a shrinking
of number of participants who can properly understand
the processes) and this is reflected in the model we pro-
pose. There is a need for research governance that has
public engagement embedded where necessary, but that
allows those with expertise to make decisions regarding
research on behalf of participants. Fundamentally, par-
ticipants voluntarily agree to be a part of an institution
that makes decisions about the future as it becomes the
present. This is not a specific consent to future research
but a perfectly reasonable consent to fair and transpar-
ent methods of governance and decision-making.
Objection: Unpredictable Future
The future is highly unpredictable, and this has particu-
lar implications for the uncertain and ongoing evolution
of population-based research that have taken place over
recent years, and that will continue to take place into the
future. For example, the value of whole genome sequen-
cing of all samples in research biobanks was not antici-
pated. Nor was the rise of public-private partnerships
that has increasingly seen big pharma investing in bio-
banking research funded originally through public in-
vestment. The radical increase in data sharing in
population-based research was also unexpected, as has
been the emergence of whole exome sequencing that
raises new questions about how results that offer poten-
tial benefits to participants should be returned
(Lucassen, Montgomery, and Parker, 2017).
On one interpretation, broad consent might seem to
struggle with rapid and important changes of these
kinds. If broad consent is understood as a paper-based
consent that provides no easy way of re-contacting par-
ticipants, obtaining re-consent, or providing further in-
formation and updates (without huge costs each time),
then this concern would be well-founded. Equally, and
in contrast, implementing a dynamic consent approach
would make it far more straightforward to researchers to
inform and interact with their participants. It might be
thought therefore that the level of interest in dynamic
consent is based in the fact that it offers an efficient way
of addressing practical concerns that arise in a fast-
moving area of research while ensuring that the benefits
of research are realized to the greatest extent.2
However, such an interpretation of broad consent
should be resisted. Broad consent can be as flexible
and accommodating of technological evolution as the
dynamic consent model. Under a broad consent model,
researchers can introduce any re-contact, re-consent or
update arrangement they see fit to serve the purposes of
research. The main difference is that the design of this
dynamic interpretation of broad consent is researcher-
driven not participant-driven. Dynamic consent risks
becoming unmanageable in practical terms; under
broad consent, researchers can design flexibility that is
both appropriate to the goals of the research and its
public value, and benefit participants as appropriate.
For example, many research protocols now feedback
incidental findings, and there are certainly arguments
in favor of this approach (e.g. Schaefer and Savulescu,
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2018). However, there is also nothing wrong about
refusing to feedback incidental findings provided this
is made clear at the time of consent.
As we have argued, dynamic consent does not neces-
sarily maximize autonomy. But even if it did, re-
searchers are not under an obligation to maximize
participants’ autonomy or well-being at all costs—
there are other values at play.
Will this be sufficient for public trust and transpar-
ency? That of course is a challenge. But, given the vast
benefits research has produced for the public good and
the general ethical nature of most researchers, re-
searchers should be invested with the power to show
their colors.
The Future of Consent and
Governance
We have suggested that the future of consent in popu-
lation-level biomedical research requires exploring the
limits of the authority of the participants’ role in shap-
ing and controlling the research. We argue that that
current trends move in a mistaken and unjustified dir-
ection: researchers and research governance structures
are by their nature vested with an authority and should
use expertise to determine the nature and progression of
research. In so doing, consent to research at the popu-
lation-level needs the creation of systems of reflexive
governance (Porsdam Mann et al., 2016).
This future is one where the autonomy of participants
is respected by giving them a choice to participate in
open-ended research, where the limits are defined in a
broad consent. Such research is designed by researchers
and institutions which are responsible to society. This
involves the use of appropriate expertise and authority
to construct and conduct research that produces public
benefit. There are many settings where there is no op-
portunity to repeatedly change one’s mind once com-
mitted to a process, and we have argued here that
population level research is, for the most part, one of
these settings.
Notes
1. “Dynamic consent is more than just another type of
consent. It is a communication and engagement ap-
proach that could accommodate any of these con-
sents depending upon the wishes of individual
participants and the particular circumstances of
the research project.” (Budin-Ljosne, 2015; Budin-
Ljosne et al., 2017).
2. We thank one anonymous reviewer for this objec-
tion.
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